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Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have 
proliferated over the past decade, but there has been 
little systematic investigation of which of them can 
accommodate its badness.  This paper is such a study.  
In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-
instrumental badness of pain’s unpleasantness; and 
those who argue that this badness cannot be 
accommodated by the view—which I and others have 
advocated—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive 
experiences with evaluative content.  Against the 
former, I argue that pain’s unpleasantness does indeed 
have non-instrumental badness; against the latter, I 
argue both that my critics’ own desire-theoretic 
accounts of pain’s unpleasantness cannot accommodate 
such badness, and that my evaluativist view can—either 
by appealing to “anti-unpleasantness” desires or by 
exploiting pain’s perceptuality. 
 
I.  Two Conditions 
 
Suppose you’re asked why you took a painkiller.  An obvious reply is:  “I 
was in pain”.  Pressed to say more, you might elaborate: “My pain was 
unpleasant.”  And, if your interlocutor still isn’t satisfied, you might add:  
“Unpleasant pain is a bad state to be in.”  This last claim is surely true.  We 
don’t take painkillers to prevent bodily damage, but to prevent or reduce 
unpleasant pain.  And this, surely, is a good reason to take them.  Similarly, 
there is good reason to pity people in unpleasant pain and to condemn its 
gratuitous infliction on others.  For, quite simply,  unpleasant pain is pro 
tanto bad for its subjects.  But can current accounts of the nature of 
unpleasant pain accommodate that normative truth?  That is our topic. 
I specified “unpleasant pain”.  So I am not talking about the pains 
undergone by pain asymbolics or any other non-unpleasant pains.1  I also 
said “pro tanto”.  So my claim shouldn’t be doubted on the basis that 
unpleasant pains are good for you.  They are indeed.  They prevent 
damage, aid recovery, and contribute to learning.  People incapable of 
pain die young.  Moreover, unpleasant pains can cause pleasure and 
cultivate and enable the exercise of virtues.2  But, for all that, an 
unpleasant pain is still bad for you, even if only slightly, even if only pro 
tanto, even if (in other words) its badness is outweighed—perhaps far 
outweighed—by its benefits. 
 We can go further:  your unpleasant pain is not only bad for you, 
but bad for you non-instrumentally—that is, independently of its bad 
consequences.  Or so I shall argue.  Hence we can distinguish among three 
loci of disvalue when a rotten tooth of yours is aching.  Upstream of your 
pain is the damage in your tooth, which is bad for you.  Downstream are 
your pain’s negative emotional consequences—for instance anxiety and 
anger—which are bad for you.  And, nestled between the damage and 
those consequences, is the pain’s unpleasantness, which is also—and 
independently—bad for you. 
 This idea, that unpleasant pain is non-instrumentally bad for a 
subject, underlies the following: 
 
Normative condition 
Being in unpleasant pain could consist in being in state 
φ only if being in state φ is, in the relevant cases, non-
instrumentally bad for its subject. 
 
That condition, I take it, must be met by parties to what we might call the 
“affect debate”—the currently vigorous debate about the nature of pain’s 
unpleasantness.  Now, many also claim that parties to that debate must 
meet a second condition, one arising from taking “Why did you take a 
painkiller?” as a demand not for a justification (as above) but for a 
motivation.   For it is thought that what motivates a subject in pain to take 
																																								 																				
1 On pain asymbolia, see Grahek 2007 and Bain 2014. 
2 On pleasure, see Bastian and Leknes 2014; on virtue, see Brady forthcoming-b. 
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a painkiller is the unpleasantness of her pain itself.3  Unpleasant pain, the 
idea goes, is in this sense self-eliminating.  Hence the following condition: 
 
Self-elimination condition  
Being in unpleasant pain could consist in being in state 
φ only if being in state φ could, in the relevant cases, 
itself motivate actions aimed at minimising the subject’s 
unpleasant pain. 
 
Now, in the present paper I ask how these two requirements—the 
normative and self-elimination conditions—bear on the affect debate.  In 
particular, I focus on the charge—made recently by Murat Aydede, 
Michael Brady, Matthew Fulkerson, and Hilla Jacobson—that 
evaluativism,  a view of mine according to which pain’s unpleasantness is 
to be explained in terms of evaluative perception, cannot handle the two 
conditions.4  I proceed as follows.  In §2, I formulate evaluativism and 
explain the charge.  In §3, I argue that the charge cannot be avoided 
simply by denying the normative condition.  And in the remainder of the 
paper, I respond to the charge:  first, by denying that my critics’ own 
desire-theoretic accounts of unpleasantness meet the normative condition 
(§§4-6) and, second, by showing how evaluativism can meet it—and how, 
moreover, it can handle, if not meet, the self-elimination condition too (§§7-
8). 
 
2.  Evaluativism and Two Objections 
 
What is it to be in pain?  And in virtue of what is a pain unpleasant?  My 
evaluativist answer (also given by Bennett Helm, Brian Cutter, and 
Michael Tye) is this:5 
 
																																								 																				
3 See for example Aydede and Fulkerson’s “e-Motivation” (forthcoming). 
4 For the charge, see Aydede and Fulkerson in review, Brady 2015, Jacobson 2013 and in review, 
and my own 2013. 
5 See Bain 2013 and 2017, Helm 2002, and Cutter and Tye 2011. 
Evaluativism 
1. Your being in pain consists in your undergoing an 
interoceptive experience (the pain) that represents 
bodily damage. 
2. Your pain’s being unpleasant consists in its 
additionally representing that damage as bad for you. 
	
Contrast this with the once-orthodox idea that, while visual and other 
perceptual experiences are intentional or content-bearing, pains and other 
bodily sensations are “blank”, sometimes enabling one to infer how one’s 
own body is, but not themselves endowed with personal-level content 
(McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980).  Claim (1) breaks with that tradition.  It says 
that pains are content-bearing perceptual experiences, in particular 
interoceptive experiences—in which you are aware of your own body 
“from the inside”— that represent, correctly or incorrectly, that a body 
part of yours is in a given extramental state, for instance (as above) being 
damaged or (on other versions of the view) being under threat of damage or 
undergoing some kind of “disturbance”.6  However, what sets evaluativism 
apart from many of its current rivals is not claim (1), which current rivals 
tend to share, but claim (2), which explains your pain’s unpleasantness in 
terms of its evaluative content—again, its representing something more than 
that the given body part is damaged, namely that the damage is bad for 
you.  Notice, crucially, that the represented badness on this view is not the 
badness of the unpleasant pain, but rather the badness of a bodily 
condition.  So the idea, again, is that it is by dint of representing the 
badness-for-you of some bodily damage (say) that your pain is 
unpleasant, and it is in turn by dint of your pain’s being unpleasant that 
your pain is bad-for-you.  
And here the trouble starts.  For mental states rarely instantiate 
the properties they represent.  A visual experience of a red cube is not 
itself a red cube.  So why, my four critics ask, think that interoceptive 
experiences representing conditions of your body as bad for you are 
themselves bad for you (non-instrumentally)?  And if they are not, the 
objection goes, then evaluativism violates the normative condition:  it 
																																								 																				
6 Although I suspect the version invoking threat is preferable (Bain 2017), I will for simplicity 
stick with the more typical damage-invoking version in this paper. 
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explains something that is non-instrumentally bad for you (namely, your 
pain’s unpleasantness) in terms of something that is not (namely, your 
experience’s representing a state as bad for you).   
Recall your rotten tooth.  For all that has been said, evaluativists 
can accommodate the badness-for-you of two things:  your tooth’s rotten 
state, and the emotional consequences of the unpleasant pain it causes.  
But evaluativism (the worry goes) cannot accommodate the badness-for-
you of the pain’s unpleasantness itself.  For evaluativism says that the 
unpleasantness consists in the pain representing that your tooth’s state is 
bad for you, and what is non-instrumentally bad about that? 
Call this the normative objection.  It is often elaborated in terms 
of two non-pain cases.  The first is evaluative belief (Brady 2015, Jacobson 
in review).  Suppose you come to believe, correctly, that you are seriously 
ill and that your being so is a bad situation for you to be in. Independently 
of its consequences, does that belief make your situation worse?  Surely 
not, the critics insist.  And, they insist, just as believing that things are bad 
for you is not non-instrumentally bad for you, so experiencing things to be 
bad for you is not non-instrumentally bad for you. 
 The other case is evaluative testimony (Jacobson 2013 and in 
review).  For evaluativists, it is assumed, construe unpleasant pains as 
episodes in which your pain system conveys to you bad news about your 
body.  But why should bad news being conveyed to you itself be bad for 
you, independently of the truth of the news or the effects of its being 
conveyed?  Surely what is bad about bad news is whatever the news 
concerns, and the effects of hearing it, not the mere fact of having it 
conveyed.  If evaluativism were true, the worry goes, then taking a 
painkiller just to eliminate your pain’s unpleasantness (as against its 
consequences) would be irrational.  But it isn’t.  Hence the  normative 
objection is sometimes known as the messenger-shooting objection.  
Turning to the self-elimination condition, the critics say that 
evaluativism violates it too (Aydede and Fulkerson in review).  
Evaluativists tend to claim that experiences representing damaged bodily 
states as bad for you can themselves motivate you (pro tanto) to act to 
eliminate those states (Helm 2002, Bain 2013 and In review).  But, even if 
true, this fails to explain how your unpleasant pain motivates the taking of 
painkillers or other behaviour aimed at minimising not damaged states, 
but your unpleasant pain itself.  Again, for evaluativists, pain’s 
unpleasantness is a first-order state, representing the extra-mental world; 
but how could such a state motivate second-order behaviour, aimed at 
minimising the mental state of unpleasant pain? 
In sum, the objection is that evaluativism violates both the 
normative and self-elimination conditions.  For now, I shall set aside the 
self-elimination condition.  Let us ask, then:  how might the normative 
condition be handled? 
 
3.  Strategy 1:  Instrumentalism 
 
Might we just deny the normative condition?  Might we insist that pains 
are bad only in virtue of their bad consequences?  This approach—call it 
instrumentalism or strategy 1—has recently been defended by Manolo 
Martínez (2015).  For him, the key to pain’s badness is its motivationality.  
He thinks your pain motivates you (pro tanto) to minimise the damage it 
represents, which he models in terms of its inserting into your “action 
plan”—your continually updated ranking of goals—the following goal:  to 
minimise the represented state of bodily damage as soon as possible.  Thereby, 
your pain demotes all goals ranked below the new one.  Presumably, what 
you actually do might not be affected.  You might take the stroll you 
wanted to despite the pain in your ankle.  But your pain still affects your 
ranking, perhaps changing what you would have done had your desire for 
a stroll been weaker.  And, for Martínez, it is in virtue of this sort of 
interference with one’s action plans—“intrusiveness”, as I shall call it—
that unpleasant pains are bad.7  Why are intrusive effects bad?  Martínez 
doesn’t say, but Colin Klein (who advances a similar view) does.8  
Intrusiveness, he says, compromises your agency (Klein 2015b).  
 Now, Martínez is not an evaluativist, but an imperativist.  He 
claims that pains are unpleasant and motivational by dint of being 
experiential commands.  But notice my version of evaluativism shares 
with imperativism the idea that unpleasant pains are inherently 
motivational.  They are, I think, motivational by dint of their evaluative 
																																								 																				
7 I have set aside Martínez’s talk of “spammy” pains—pains that demote “reasonable” goals for 
goals that are “unfulfillable or misguided” (2015: 2270)—since I take it Martinez thinks that 
even non-spammy pains have intrusive effects and are thereby pro tanto bad.  
8 Or at least his view seems similar.  It is sometimes unclear whether Klein is explaining what 
makes pains unpleasant or what makes their unpleasantness bad (2015b:  ch. 14). 
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content.  Hence it would be good news for me if Martínez’s 
instrumentalism were plausible.  For I too might then invoke pain’s 
intrusive effects and deny the normative condition.  Unfortunately, 
however, Martínez’s instrumentalism is not plausible. 
One problem is that intrusiveness is not limited to pain or even to 
unpleasant experience in general.  Non-unpleasant urges—not to step on 
the cracks in the pavement, for instance—can also be intrusive.  So can 
pleasures.  Hence Martínez looks committed to saying that a pleasurable 
experience too inserts various goals into your action plan:  to prolong that 
experience, perhaps, or to prolong the condition it represents.  Yet surely 
the pleasurable experience is not thereby bad for you, not even pro tanto.  
And even were it, there is surely a profoundly important, different way in 
which your unpleasant experiences, for instance your pains, are bad for 
you.   
Relatedly, one of the things that is bad for you about your pain is 
something that can be profoundly hard to tolerate, even when the pain is 
only momentary.  Whatever this bad-making feature is, it is surely not 
intrusiveness.  For suppose, suffering intense but brief agony under 
torture, you cry “I can’t stand this”.  What is it that you so profoundly 
cannot stand?  The forced re-ordering of your goals?  There may be cases 
in which that would be plausible, if for instance chronic pain had 
interfered for many years with how you live.  But it is not plausible in the 
torture case, in which the pain—and its re-ordering of your goals—is 
fleeting. What, then, is it that you cannot stand?  The feel of your 
unpleasant pain itself, I suggest; again, the awful way things seem to you 
when in such pain.9 
Parting with Martínez, other instrumentalists might appeal to 
consequences other than pain’s intrusiveness, perhaps most promisingly 
to downstream negative emotions such as anxiety and anger.  These, after 
all, can be hard to stand.  But notice that one of the things we worry about 
when in unpleasant pain is, precisely, the unpleasant pain itself:  that it 
might not stop or might worsen.  And it is quite unclear that 
instrumentalists who explain the badness of pain entirely in terms of 
																																								 																				
9 Intolerability requires more attention than it has received.  One question is whether finding 
something intolerable is more than having a strong intrinsic desire that it not occur.  Even if not, 
my point stands, since what you so strongly want the non-occurrence of when tortured is surely 
not the re-ordering of your priorities.  
emotional effects can make sense of that worry.  Suppose, under torture, 
you somehow know that you will not betray any secrets or sustain any 
bodily damage.  And suppose the only negative emotion you undergo 
during the torture is a worry you would express thus:  “This pain might 
get even worse”.  Surely that is not a worry about itself:  a worry that this 
very worry will get worse.  Might it instead be a worry that you will come 
to experience new worries?  That too is implausible.  You might have good 
reason to doubt that the torture will induce new worries—or other 
negative emotions—and yet you might still worry that the pain will get 
worse.  Instead, I suggest, your worry is a worry that the feeling of your 
pain’s unpleasantness itself will get worse, and worse in a way not 
exhausted by its causing or intensifying either this very worry or any 
other emotional effects.  But our instrumentalist, who denies that the  
feeling of your pain’s unpleasantness is itself non-instrumentally bad, 
cannot make sense of that. 
This instrumentalist must also explain what is bad about the 
negative emotions invoked.  Plausibly, what is bad is their unpleasantness.  
But how is our instrumentalist to explain the badness of that?  Appealing 
only to intrusiveness is no more promising here than in the case of pain’s 
unpleasantness.  So, here—or soon, as the causal chain of negative feelings 
unfolds—the instrumentalist looks bound to appeal to a feeling that is 
potentially intolerable and bad for its subject non-instrumentally.  And 
why, we might wonder, is imputing non-instrumental disvalue to the 
feeling downstream more plausible than imputing it to pain’s 
unpleasantness at the outset? 
 Finally, whether it appeals to intrusiveness or emotional 
suffering, instrumentalism faces the following challenge.  After a long and 
happy life, Stan regards with equanimity the painless death he knows is 
coming in the next few minutes, which he is spending walking bare-foot 
along a beach at sunset, awaiting his favourite moment when the sun slips 
below the horizon.  Here are two ways Stan’s story might unfold.  At 
world 1, he steps on a sharp stone in the sand.  This causes a fleeting but 
intense pain.  But it does not cause bodily damage.  Nor is he annoyed or 
upset or made anxious by the brief pain.  Yet it does direct his attention to 
his foot, resulting in his missing the sunset’s final moment.  At world 2, by 
contrast, the stone is a metre to the left, so Stan doesn’t step on it and does 
not feel any pain.  But he does hear a rustle in the bushes.  He is not upset 
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or annoyed or made anxious by this auditory experience.  Yet it does 
direct his attention to the bushes, resulting in his missing (as at world 1) 
the sunset’s final moment.  Now, neither world is very bad for Stan.  Even 
so, I suggest that, all else equal, world 1 (in which what causes Stan to 
miss his favourite moment is a pain) is slightly worse—or less good—for 
him than world 2 (in which what causes him to miss his favourite moment 
is an experience of rustling).  But how to explain that?  Not in terms of any 
damage the stone causes at world 1, since it doesn’t.  Nor in terms of any 
unpleasant emotional effects his pain causes, since it doesn’t.  Nor in terms 
of his missing the sunset’s final moment, since that happens at both 
worlds.  Nor in terms of any other intrusive effects of his pain, since his 
pain is no more intrusive than his auditory experience.  Rather, I suggest, 
world 1 is worse because of the non-instrumental badness of the 
unpleasantness of the pain that Stan feels when he steps on the stone.   
In sum, we cannot save evaluativism (or imperativism) by simply 
denying the normative condition.  So what should we do?  In what 
follows, I take a dual approach.  In §§4-6, I question whether those who 
deny that evaluativism meets the normative condition—“my critics”—can 
meet it themselves.  In §§7-8, I argue that evaluativism actually can meet 
the condition, using either of two strategies. 
 
4.  SOD and Two Desire-Based Strategies 
 
The currently dominant approach to the normative condition is to explain 
pain’s unpleasantness in terms not of evaluative or imperative content, but 
rather desires, and then to invoke those very same desires to explain the 
badness of its unpleasantness. This is the approach taken by my four critics:  
Aydede, Brady, Fulkerson, and Jacobson.10  It comes in numerous forms, 
but I will argue they all fail.  I begin, in this section, with the second-order 
desire view (SOD) and two normative strategies its adherents might 
advance. 
Embraced by many, including Brady, SOD can be formulated as 
follows: 11 
																																								 																				
10 See Aydede 2014 and Aydede and Fulkerson forthcoming; Brady 2015, forthcoming-a, and 
forthcoming-b; and Jacobson in review.  On this categorisation of Aydede and Fulkerson’s view, 
see note 16 below. 
11 See Armstrong 1962, Brady 2015, Heathwood 2007.  For more references, see Bain 2013. 
 
Second-order desire view (SOD) 
1. Your being in pain consists in your undergoing an 
interoceptive experience (the pain) that represents 
bodily damage. 
2.  Your pain’s being unpleasant consists in your having 
an intrinsic desire that it (the pain) not occur.   
 
On this formulation, SOD theorists agree with evaluativists about what 
makes an experience a pain—its representing bodily damage—but 
disagree about what makes it unpleasant.12  It counts as unpleasant, they 
think, not in virtue of possessing evaluative content, but in virtue of your 
intrinsically wanting its non-occurrence.  As I’ll put it, your pain is 
unpleasant by dint of your having the right negative, second-order desire, 
namely an anti-pain desire (where I use the terms “anti-x desire”, 
“negative desire”, and “desire for not-x” for an intrinsic desire for x not to 
occur, and “second-order desire” for desires directed at one’s own mental 
states).  
 But how might anti-pain desires explain the badness of 
unpleasantness?  The core idea is that undergoing an experience you want 
not to be undergoing—as SOD entails you are when in unpleasant pain—
is a non-instrumentally bad state to be in.  But notice (as it often isn’t) that 
there is a choice here between two different normative strategies: 
 
Strategy 2:  the desire strategy 
Explain the badness-for-you of your pain’s 
unpleasantness in terms of two ideas: (a) the 
unpleasantness being constituted by an anti-pain desire; 
(b) narrow-scope Humeanism:  that if S has an anti-x 
desire, then it is pro tanto non-instrumentally bad for S 
that x obtain. 
 
																																								 																				
12 A few don’t accept (1), but (2) is my focus here.  
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Strategy 3:  the desire-frustration strategy 
Explain the badness-for-you of your pain’s 
unpleasantness in terms of two ideas: (a) the 
unpleasantness being constituted by an anti-pain desire; 
and (b) wide-scope Humeanism:  that it is pro tanto 
non-instrumentally bad for S that S have an anti-x desire 
while x obtains. 
 
The two strategies differ in respect of narrow- and wide-scope 
Humeanism.  To appreciate the contrast, suppose your mother is ill and 
you want her not to be.  What is bad for you?  According to narrow-scope 
Humeanism:  your mother’s being ill.  According to wide-scope 
Humeanism:  the conjunctive state of affairs of your mother’s being ill 
while you want her not to be.  Again, according to narrow-scope 
Humeanism, there is a justifying reason for you to eliminate your mother’s 
illness, whereas according to wide-scope Humeanism there is a justifying 
reason for you either to eliminate her illness or to eliminate your desire for 
her not to be ill—by, say, taking an anti-desire pill.  In other words:  
narrow-scope Humeanism makes your desire a ground of your mother’s 
illness’s being bad for you, whereas wide-scope Humeanism makes it a 
constituent of the state of affairs that is bad for you.  So, returning to anti-
pain desires and the badness of unpleasant pain, strategy 2 in SOD’s 
hands entails the desire-dependent badness-for-you of your anti-pain 
desires’ objects—your pains—whereas strategy 3 entails the badness-for-
you of your anti-pain desires’ frustration.  The question is:  does either 
strategy work?13 
																																								 																				
13 The distinction between these two varieties of Humeanism is akin to scope distinctions 
regarding what you have reason to do, or ought to do, and also what you have reason to judge.  
On the former, see M. Schroeder 2007 (chs. 2 and 5) and also Brady forthcoming-a, Cullity 1997, 
Foot 1972, and Way 2010.  On the latter, see M. Schroeder 2013 and 2015.  Notice that, as 
formulated, narrow-scope Humeanism doesn’t make it a necessary condition of x’s being non-
instrumentally bad for you that you have an anti-x desire; nor does wide-scope Humeanism say 
that desire-frustration is the only thing that is non-instrumentally bad for a subject.  Notice too 
that there are restricted versions of Humeanism on which only some desires (e.g. those you 
would have in certain idealised conditions) entail a thing’s goodness or badness for you (or are 
such that their frustration is non-instrumentally bad for you).  See for instance Smith 1994 and 
Railton 2003.  Such restrictions won’t matter for our purposes.  
 Here are two worries about the desire strategy, at least in SOD’s 
hands.  First, while Humeanism of either stripe is controversial, we might 
especially balk at the wide-scope version, in particular at the idea that 
your intrinsic desire for your mother not to be ill together with the fact 
that she is ill constitutes a non-instrumental reason on which you could act 
not only by taking steps to make her better but also by popping an anti-desire pill.  
Why balk at that?  Well, for one thing, when you act to make her better, 
that you want her not to be ill doesn’t enter into the content of your 
motivations.  Relatedly, what you take to be your reason for action is surely 
that she is ill, not that she is ill and you want her not to be.  For another thing, 
wide-scope Humeanism arguably conflicts with the following, attractive 
reading of the prevalent thought that desires contrast with beliefs in 
having a world-to-mind direction of fit:  that in cases of world-desire 
mismatch—contrast world-belief mismatch—one should change the world 
to fit one’s desire rather than one’s desire to fit the world (which is not, 
notice, to deny that we sometimes have instrumental reasons to rid 
ourselves of desires we believe not to be easily satisfiable). 
 Now, getting to the bottom of these general issues is beyond this 
paper’s scope, but notice there is also a more specific worry about the 
desire-frustration strategy in SOD’s hands, namely that it appears to 
violate the intuition I used against Martínez:  that what is bad for you 
when in unpleasant pain is how your unpleasant pain feels to you.  For the 
desire-frustration strategy says that what is bad for you is your anti-pain 
desire’s frustration.  Yet a desire’s frustration is not itself a feeling.  True, 
there is such a thing as feeling frustrated, but what the desire-frustration 
strategy says is bad for you is not that or any other feeling, but rather 
frustration in the semantic sense, that is the non-satisfaction of a desire.  And 
one’s desires can be frustrated in that sense even when one is unconscious 
and not feeling anything at all.14    
 In this respect, the desire strategy might seem to improve on the 
desire-frustration strategy.  For if the anti-pain desire that SOD invokes is 
construed as a desire for the feel of your pain not to occur, then it is 
																																								 																				
14 Another worry about the desire-frustration strategy in SOD’s hands is that your anti-pain 
desire is arguably not frustrated in a case in which it is a desire had at noon for the immediate 
cessation of a pain that indeed ceases a millisecond after noon.  But this worry might be 
addressed by invoking (as my formulation does) desires not that the pain stop, but that it not be 
occurring now.  
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precisely that feel that the desire strategy says is bad for you.  
Nonetheless, I fear the desire strategy also mislocates the badness of your 
unpleasant pain.  True, it locates it in a feeling—but the wrong feeling.  For 
notice that SOD invokes anti-pain and not anti-unpleasantness desires.  
Hence, in SOD’s hands, what the strategy makes non-instrumentally bad 
for you is your pain per se, not your pain’s unpleasantness.  Yet, I suggest, 
really it is your pain’s unpleasantness that is non-instrumentally bad for 
you. 
Care is needed here.  The point is not that SOD theorists who 
pursue the desire strategy are committed to the implausible idea that non-
unpleasant pains (for instance, asymbolic or morphine pains) are non-
instrumentally bad for their subjects.  They needn’t say that since they will 
claim that the ground of the non-instrumental badness of pain per se 
(namely, an anti-pain desire) is absent in non-unpleasant cases.  But, even 
so, they are committed to saying that, when a pain is unpleasant, what is 
non-instrumentally bad for the subject is the pain per se and not its 
unpleasantness.  And this too, I think, is implausible.   
Suppose, in agony, you howl “I want the pain to stop”.  Despite 
your use of the word “pain”, I claim the following:  your howl—if it gave 
voice to an intrinsic desire at all—gave voice to an anti-unpleasantness and 
not an anti-pain desire.  To see this, suppose that I respond to your cry by 
giving you morphine, which entirely eliminates (as morphine sometimes 
does) the unpleasantness but not the pain.  Despite the persistence of the 
pain, wouldn’t you say that I had satisfied the desire you voiced?  Again, in 
giving you morphine and eliminating the unpleasantness, surely I have 
not merely eliminated the desire you voiced (as in a case where I terminate 
rather than satisfy your desire that your mother not be ill) but have given 
you just what you said—or, better, meant—you wanted.  So far as your 
intrinsic desires regarding your unpleasant pain go, indeed, I have given 
you everything you wanted. 
We can come at the same point from the other direction.  
Suppose I respond to your cry instead with an anti-pain drug:  a drug that 
eliminates the pain by somehow substituting for it another sensation—
perhaps an itch—that is precisely as unpleasant as the pain was.  In this 
case I suspect you would complain that I had misunderstood what your 
howl of “I want the pain to stop” was getting at.  You would, I suggest, 
complain that I hadn’t satisfied any desires of yours.  For, again, what you 
wanted was for the unpleasantness to stop.   
In sum, I think it doubtful that that we typically have anti-pain as 
against anti-unpleasantness desires.  And since our negative intrinsic 
desires at least reflect what we take to be non-instrumentally bad, this is 
evidence that pain per se is not non-instrumentally bad for a subject.  Yet, 
in SOD’s hands, the desire strategy says it is. 
That we don’t typically have anti-pain desires, notice, also poses 
a more direct problem than the mislocation of badness.  And it is a 
problem facing not just the desire strategy in SOD’s hands, but the desire-
frustration strategy too.  For, in SOD’s hands, both strategies appeal to 
anti-pain desires to explain why unpleasant pains are typically bad:  the 
desire strategy appeals to their normative implications for their objects, 
the desire-frustration strategy to the normative significance of their 
frustration.  Yet neither appeal is plausible if anti-pain desires are desires 
we typically lack.15 
In SOD’s hands, then, both the desire and desire-frustration 
strategies are problematic.  So let us now turn to an alternative to SOD, 
and ask whether it can make better use of desire-based normative 
strategies. 
 
5.  FOD:  the Desire and Desire-Frustration Strategies 
 
In recent years, first-order accounts of pain’s unpleasantness have 
challenged SOD’s dominance.  These include imperativism, evaluativism, 
and the first-order desire view (FOD).  FOD, the last of these, numbers 
among its adherents my three remaining critics:  Aydede, Fulkerson, and 
Jacobson.  It can also seem an especially attractive alternative to SOD.  
Eschewing anti-pain desires but not desire altogether, it avoids some of 
SOD’s problems while looking able to exploit the SOD theorist’s putative 
insight:  that the normative status of pain’s unpleasantness might be 
explained via the normative power of desire.16  In this section and the next, 
																																								 																				
15 SOD theorists might respond by explaining pain’s unpleasantness in terms of anti-
unpleasantness desires instead.  But that would require saying, unattractively, that a given desire 
might be both directed at and constitutive of a given instance of unpleasantness. 
16 See Aydede 2014, Aydede and Fulkerson forthcoming, and Jacobson 2014 and in review.  As 
psychofunctionalists, Aydede and Fulkerson say that a pain’s unpleasantness consists in the 
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however, I argue that this appearance is illusory, that the desire-based 
normative strategies that failed for SOD also fail for FOD, and that a third 
and final desire-based strategy fails too.  
FOD claims the following:   
 
First-order desire view (FOD) 
1.  Your being in pain consists in your undergoing an 
interoceptive experience (the pain) that represents 
bodily damage. 
2. Your pain being unpleasant consists in your having 
an experience-based intrinsic desire that that bodily 
damage (represented by the pain) not obtain.  
 
For FOD, then, what makes a pain unpleasant is not an anti-pain desire, 
but an anti-damage desire, and (I take it) not a general anti-damage desire, 
but a desire for the given instance of damage represented by the pain not 
to be occurring, perhaps a desire whose reference is fixed by the pain to 
that instance in the manner of a demonstrative thought—so a desire, 
again, for that damage not to occur.17  Now, for us, the question is:  how 
might this desire explain your unpleasant pain’s badness?  In particular, 
might either of the desire-based strategies that failed for SOD work for 
FOD? 
The desire strategy doesn’t.  Its idea is that if S has an anti-x 
desire then x’s obtaining is non-instrumentally bad for S.  But in the hands 
of FOD, which invokes anti-damage rather than anti-pain desires, this could 
at best explain the badness of instances of bodily damage, which is not 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
“negative m-processing” of the information registered by the pain, which information concerns 
bodily disorder (forthcoming).  But here I count this a version of FOD since they “identify” a 
pain experience’s involving such processing with its involving a “phenomenologically salient 
experiential desire”, one to the effect that the represented disorder “cease or go away”.  
Admittedly, they distinguish the idea of such “phen-desires” from the “ordinary” concept of 
desire, but they are clear that phen-desires are “desire-like” and their idea that “phen-desire 
frustration … is itself bad” derives whatever plausibility it has from the kinship between phen-
desires and ordinary desires.  See also note 27 below. 
17 This is one way of capturing the experientiality that FOD theorists tend to attribute to their 
unpleasantness-constituting desires (see note 16 above).  For doubts about the normative 
relevance of any conception of a desire’s experientiality, see §6 below. 
what was supposed to be explained.  The explanandum is rather the 
badness of unpleasant pain. 
For FOD theorists, the desire-frustration strategy might seem 
more promising.  For it invokes not the badness of an anti-damage desire’s 
object, but the badness of an anti-damage desire’s frustration.  And indeed 
this, at times, appears to be the strategy my three remaining critics’ have 
in mind.  Aydede and Fulkerson say, for instance, that what is bad for you 
about an unpleasant pain is that it consists in a damage-representing 
experience being accompanied by a frustrated “desire-like” state focused 
on that damage, adding that desire-frustration “is itself bad” 
(forthcoming).18  And Jacobson speaks of your pain’s “painfulness” being 
“constituted by a (frustrated) conative attitude”, and she goes on to give 
an account of the badness of such frustration (in review).  But I fear that, 
for FOD,  the desire-frustration strategy fails as surely as the desire 
strategy did. 
For one thing, some of our earlier worries recur:  namely, that 
desire-frustration is not a feeling, and that wide-scope Humeanism is 
highly controversial.  But there is also a more straightforward difficulty:  
not all cases of non-instrumentally bad pains involve the frustration of 
anti-damage desires.  Consider, for example: 
 
Pain Illusion.  You have an intensely unpleasant pain in 
your foot.  But there is no damage in that foot.  Rather, 
the unpleasant pain is illusory, caused by some central 
neuropathy. 
 
In this case, the desire-frustration strategy in FOD’s hands says the 
following:  your pain consists in your interoceptively representing your 
foot as damaged; its unpleasantness consists in your wanting that damage 
not to occur; and the badness of its unpleasantness consists in that desire 
being frustrated.  But notice:  that desire isn’t frustrated!  You want your 
foot not to be damaged and it isn’t.19 
																																								 																				
18 Actually, they talk of disturbance- rather than damage-representation, but this difference 
doesn’t matter for our purposes.  On “desire-like” states, see note 16 above. 
19  There is prima facie no parallel difficulty for SOD.  For cases in which it falsely seems to one 
that one is undergoing an experience whose non-occurrence one wants are harder to imagine. 
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It might be replied that illusory pains, representing damage 
where there is none, are not unpleasant (perhaps because unpleasantness-
constituting anti-damage desires exist only when they successfully refer).  
But if pains represent bodily damage or disturbances, then pain illusions 
are widespread, and it simply beggars belief to say that none of the 
illusory cases is unpleasant. FOD theorists might alternatively claim that 
illusory pains, even if unpleasant, are not non-instrumentally bad for you.  
But this too beggars belief.  Consider a veridical unpleasant pain that is 
non-instrumentally bad for you.  Suppose now that God eliminates the 
damage but tweaks your brain so that your pain experience persists, 
phenomenally unchanged.  In this case, God has eliminated your pain’s 
veridicality but not, surely, its non-instrumental badness.  
The problem, notice, can put in terms of the following idea: 
  
A strategy is additionalist just in case it explains the non-
instrumental badness for you of your unpleasant pain in 
terms of something additional to what constitutes your 
unpleasant pain. 
 
In FOD’s hands, the desire-frustration strategy is additionalist.  It says that 
your unpleasant pain comprises a damage-representing experience and an 
anti-damage desire, and that its non-instrumental badness additionally 
requires the desire’s frustration—in other words that the given body part 
actually be damaged.20  The problem is simply that this additional state of 
affairs is not, in truth, required. 
 In short, the desire and desire-frustration strategies fail not only 
for SOD but also for FOD.  Even so, there is a final desire-based strategy 
that looks more promising.  Let ‘s turn now to it. 
 
6.  FOD and Subjective Desire-Frustration 
 
A way forward for FOD theorists, it might seem, is to explain the badness 
of unpleasant pain in terms of subjective rather than real desire-frustration.  
After all, even if your anti-damage desire in Pain Illusion is not really 
																																								 																				
20 For SOD, by contrast, the desire-frustrating circumstance—namely, your having a pain 
experience—is not additional to but a component of the compound that is the unpleasant pain.  
frustrated, it seems to you to be.  And this, FOD theorists might say, is 
what is non-instrumentally bad for you.  In short, they might pursue the 
following: 
 
Strategy 4.  Subjective desire-frustration  
Explain the badness-for-you of your pain’s 
unpleasantness in terms of two ideas: (a) the 
unpleasantness of a pain is constituted by an anti-
damage desire; and (b) subjective desire-frustration is 
non-instrumentally bad for its subject. 
 
This strategy, in the end, seems to be what Jacobson really has in mind.  
And it may also be what Aydede and Fulkerson are gesturing at when 
they talk not only of desire-frustration, but of desire-frustration “as 
registered by … incoming sensory information” (forthcoming).21  But I 
shall argue it fails.  For, though there are multiple construals of the notion 
of subjective desire-frustration, none serves FOD’s purposes.   
Notice, to begin with, that it won’t do to construe subjective 
desire-frustration in terms of a feeling of frustration additional to your 
pain’s unpleasantness caused by the conjunction of your anti-damage 
desire with a belief that the anti-damage desire is frustrated. For, among 
other problems, this construal could at best yield an account of the 
instrumental badness of unpleasant pain, which is not what we’re after.22 
   So how else might we construe the subjective desire-
frustration?  There appear to be two options:  we might construe it as 
believed desire-frustration or as experienced desire-frustration.  Start with 
the first option.  It yields the following: 
 
Strategy 4a.  Believed desire-frustration 
(i) FOD:  Your unpleasant pain comprises a damage-
representing experience plus an anti-damage desire. 
																																								 																				
21 That said, note that the phrase “as registered” is ambiguous in a way I bring out below. 
22 Another problem is that there are (as we’re about to see) cases of bad, unpleasant pain where 
we don’t believe our anti-damage desire is frustrated. 
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(ii) Your unpleasant pain is non-instrumentally bad for 
you when and because you believe that desire to be 
frustrated. 
 
This, alas, also won’t do.  For suppose that in Pain Illusion you know there 
is no damage in your foot.  Then you won’t believe your anti-damage 
desire to be frustrated.  Yet your unpleasant pain will still be non-
instrumentally bad for you.  To see this, suppose that your pain initially 
misleads you into thinking there is damage in your foot, but that God 
subsequently persuades you that there isn’t.  Surely God thereby 
eliminates your belief that your desire is frustrated but not the non-
instrumental badness of your pain’s unpleasantness.  In short, this 
doxastic version of the subjective desire-frustration strategy is implausibly 
additionalist, requiring for the badness of your unpleasant pain something 
additional to your unpleasant pain (the believed frustration of your anti-
damage desire) that is, in truth, not needed. 
 So might we do better to construe subjective desire-frustration in 
terms of experienced desire-frustration, where this—let’s say—is a matter of 
wanting the non-obtaining of a circumstance you experience as obtaining?  
Well, that generates the following version of the strategy: 
 
Strategy 4b.  Experienced desire-frustration 
(i) FOD:  Your unpleasant pain comprises a damage-
representing experience and an anti-damage desire. 
(ii) Your unpleasant pain’s non-instrumental badness for 
you consists in your having an anti-damage desire while 
experiencing damage as obtaining. 
 
This strategy has advantages.  Unlike its predecessor, it can handle Pain 
Illusion.  For Pain Illusion does indeed involve subjective desire 
frustration.  It is also non-additionalist, explaining the badness of your 
unpleasant pain precisely in terms of what FOD says constitutes it, namely 
your wanting the non-obtaining of the damage you are experiencing.  But, 
for all this, there is a serious difficulty. 
Consider:  
 
Linda, strangely, has a strong intrinsic desire not to be 
facing unequal parallel lines but, thanks to the Müller-
Lyer diagram now before her, she experiences that she 
is. 
 
Linda, notice, is undergoing experienced desire-frustration in the target 
sense—she wants the non-obtaining of a circumstance she experiences as 
obtaining—yet, crucially, her situation need not be bad for her.  True, it 
might be bad for her.  She might, for instance, believe the content of her 
experience, hence believe that her anti-inequality desire is frustrated, 
hence undergo a feeling of frustration downstream.  But though, again, 
her situation might be bad for her, we can easily imagine that it is not.  This 
is easiest to imagine if we suppose that she doesn’t believe the content of 
her experience, hence doesn’t believe her desire is frustrated.  Imagine, 
then, that Linda is au fait with the Müller-Lyer illusion and knows very 
well that the lines before her are equal lengths even though she 
experiences them otherwise.  Thus construed, her situation surely need 
not be bad for her at all.  And  yet it still involves her experiencing desire-
frustration in the target sense.  So, experiencing desire-frustration in that 
sense cannot be non-instrumentally bad for a subject, hence cannot be 
what constitutes the non-instrumental badness of pain’s unpleasantness. 
 None of this is to deny that perceptual experiences can prompt 
unpleasant feelings even in subjects who disbelieve their contents.  
Consider: 
 
Ed has a strong intrinsic desire not to be standing on a 
cliff edge but, thanks to his virtual reality headset, he 
experiences that he is.  Still, he knows he is not.  
 
Even while knowing he is not really on a cliff edge, Ed’s virtual-reality 
experience might cause him to experience fear.  But the point is:  it also 
might not.  And, in the case in which it doesn’t, there plausibly need be 
nothing bad for him about his situation.  Yet his remains a case in which 
he is undergoing experienced desire-frustration in the relevant sense.  
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Hence experienced desire-frustration cannot be what makes your 
unpleasant pain non-instrumentally bad for you.23 
 In sum, Linda and Ed pose a serious difficulty for strategy 4b. 
And notice that the difficulty parallels the difficulty my critics pose for 
me.  For my critics object that what is non-instrumentally bad for you 
about your unpleasant pain cannot be your representing that your bodily 
condition is bad for you since in a pair of non-pain cases—namely, believing 
that your bodily condition is bad for you and being told that it is—the 
badness of your bodily condition is represented without your subjective 
situation itself being bad for you (see §2).  Similarly, against these critics, 
my current point is that what is non-instrumentally bad for you about 
your unpleasant pain cannot be experienced desire-frustration in the 
specified sense, since in two non-pain cases—namely, Linda’s and Ed’s—
subjects experience desire-frustration without their situations needing to 
be bad for them. 
 My critics might reply that Linda and Ed’s situations are not 
counterexamples to the non-instrumental badness of experienced desire-
frustration in the relevant sense because their situations involve either the 
wrong kind of experience or the wrong kind of desire or a failure to 
integrate the two.  The first point, focusing on Ed, might be that his 
virtual-reality experience as of a cliff edge is not a full-blown perceptual 
experience since it lacks such experience’s “phenomenology of encounter” 
(see §8 below).  But this is implausible.  Even while supposing the 
normative neutrality of Ed’s situation, we might imagine Ed saying that, 
visually, it is for him precisely as though he were standing on a cliff edge—
that if he didn’t know about the virtual reality headset, he would make an 
experience-based judgement that he were.24  Having to claim he wouldn’t 
																																								 																				
23 If, as I have been assuming, and as these cases make plausible, Linda and Ed’s situations need 
not be unpleasant despite involving experienced desire-frustration in the sense under 
discussion, then FOD’s problems concern not just the badness of unpleasantness, but 
unpleasantness itself.  For Linda and Ed’s cases meet the requirements of a generalised version of 
FOD, on which undergoing an unpleasant experience of a given sort involves that experience 
representing x and being undergone by a subject who desires not-x, and yet—again—their cases 
need not be unpleasant.  See below. 
24 If it helps, substitute for virtual reality your favourite case of perfect hallucination.  
say this, or that he would be wrong to do so, is a high price to pay to 
defend the strategy.25 
The second point is that experienced desire-frustration is bad 
only when the desire involved is an experiential desire, which Ed’s anti-
edge desire—it might be argued—is not.26  But what notion of 
“experiential desire” is this?  The idea might be that the desire involved 
must have a perceptual-demonstrative content, such as not to be on this cliff 
edge, by contrast (it might be said) with Ed’s merely general desire not to 
be on cliff edges.  But perceptual-demonstrative contents are referent-
dependent—which is arguably what underlies any intuition we have that 
they make a normative difference—and FOD theorists cannot restrict their 
strategy to desires with referent-dependent contents.  For this would fail 
to capture the badness of your unpleasant pain in Pain Illusion, where 
there was—recall—no state of damage to figure as such a desire’s referent.  
The FOD theorist might of course try to specify some other sense of 
“experiential” such that the relevant desire’s being experiential would 
make a normative difference.  But it is hard to see what sense that might 
be.  Certainly, it won’t help to define experiential desires as those that are 
in the relevant contexts unpleasantness-constituting or those whose 
subjective frustration is non-instrumentally bad for their subjects.  For that 
would be to build into the notion of an experiential desire what it was 
supposed to explain.  Nor is it easy to see how any other notion of a 
desire’s experientiality would help.  For, to the extent that FOD theorists 
try to explain why subjective desire-frustration is non-instrumentally bad, 
their explanations tend to appeal not to the relevant desires’ 
experientiality—even if they are thought to have such a feature—but to 
putative characteristics of desire per se, for instance to the badness of real 
desire-frustration, or to desire’s direction of fit, or to its normative status 
or evaluative character or reason-giving force.27 
																																								 																				
25 Similarly, if an attempt is made to save strategy 4a above from the Pain Illusion case by saying 
a subject whose pain represents an undamaged foot as damaged must believe that the foot is 
damaged, it should be pointed out that such subjects might sincerely disavow such a belief. 
26 See note 16 above.  
27 Jacobson, for instance, appears to argue from what I’ve called narrow-scope Humeanism to 
wide-scope Humeanism and from the latter to the non-instrumental badness of subjective 
desire-frustration (in review). For their part, Aydede and Fulkerson simply take the badness of 
phen-desire-frustration (or subjective phen-desire-frustration) as on its face plausible, thereby 
trading on intuitions about desires per se (see note 16 above).  In short, the relevant desires’ (or 
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The final response under this head is that, even if Linda and Ed’s 
situations involve the right kind of experience and the right kind of desire, 
they don’t involve the right kind of relation between the two.  Perhaps it 
will be said that Ed’s anti-edge desire and his edge-representing 
experience must somehow be disunited in his consciousness.  But disunited 
in what sense?  It surely is not the case that we find plausible the possible 
normative neutrality of Ed’s situation only because we are thinking of him 
as being akin to a split-brain subject (Nagel 1971).  One might after all 
imagine oneself—with unitary consciousness intact—in Ed’s situation and 
still think it needn’t involve anything bad for oneself. 
In sum, Linda and Ed’s cases remain problematic for the 
experienced desire-frustration strategy as so far understood.  But at this 
point the FOD theorist might be offered a ray of hope.  For there is another 
way of understanding experienced desire-frustration.  After all, although 
it has gone unremarked in the literature, the notion of experiencing the 
frustration of an anti-x desire is scope-ambiguous, as follows: 
 
Narrow-scope.  You desire that x not obtain.  And you 
experience that x does. 
Wide-scope.  You desire that x not obtain.  And you 
experience that x obtains while you want it not to (or, 
again, you experience x as unwanted-by-you or as 
frustrating-a-desire-of-yours). 28 
 
Thus far we’ve focused on experienced desire-frustration in the narrow-
scope sense.  That is a matter of wanting the non-obtaining of a 
circumstance that you experience as obtaining.  Wide-scope experienced 
desire-frustration, by contrast, involves experiencing the circumstance not 
just as obtaining, but as desire-frustrating.  Again, on the wide-scope 
reading, the desire-frustration itself—not just the putatively frustrating 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
phen-desires’) experientiality appears to be playing no role in FOD theorists’ normative 
explanations. 
28 It is important not to conflate this ambiguity with the distinction between narrow- and wide-
scope Humeanism.  Notice too that there is a parallel scope-ambiguity in “believing your anti-
damage desire to be frustrated” (but this is no help to strategy 4a above, since neither the 
narrow-scope nor the wide-scope belief is required for the non-instrumental badness of your 
pain’s unpleasantness). 
circumstance—is actually represented by the experience.  Hence FOD 
theorists might appeal to experienced anti-damage desire-frustration in 
this wide-scope sense instead, thereby generating the following, final 
version of the subjective desire-frustration strategy: 
 
Strategy 4c.  Experienced desire-frustration (wide-scope) 
(i) FOD:  Your unpleasant pain comprises a damage-
representing experience and an anti-damage desire. 
(ii) Your unpleasant pain is non-instrumentally bad for 
you when and because you experience that the damage 
is unwanted-by-you, or experience that the damage 
frustrates a desire of yours. 
 
This final version of the strategy is, I think, the most promising.  
For it is considerably less clear that Ed and Linda are counterexamples to 
the necessary badness of experienced desire-frustration in this wide-scope 
sense.  Start with Ed.  If he not merely wants the non-obtaining of the cliff-
edge situation while experiencing that situation to obtain, but further 
experiences the unwantedness-by-him of that situation, it becomes harder to 
deny that his subjective state must be bad for him.29  As for Linda, recall 
she experiences the Müller-Lyer lines as unequal and wants the non-
obtaining of the represented inequality—not its representation, which is 
real, but the inequality itself, which she knows not to be.  This, I claimed, 
is not necessarily bad for her.  But now suppose her experience further 
represents her desire’s frustration.  Suppose, again, it represents the 
inequality as unwanted-by-her.  This arguably shifts our intuitions.  It 
makes the idea that her situation must be bad for her more compelling.  In 
short, wide-scope desire-frustration can seem to be the notion that FOD 
theorists really need.  And as a bonus, it might be argued, it offers another 
way of unpacking the earlier idea that, for subjective desire-frustration to 
be bad for a subject, the negative desire must be “experiential” or “united 
																																								 																				
29 My claim is not that Ed ever visually represents desire-frustration, but that it is more plausible 
that his subjective situation is bad for him in a case in which he is in some perceptual or quasi-
perceptual state representing X as both obtaining and unwanted than if he is merely in the state 
of wanting not-X while visually (or otherwise) experiencing X—though see below for important 
tweaks.   
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in consciousness” with the subject’s perceptual experience.  For the sense 
in which that must be so, it might now be said, is simply that the desire—
or rather its frustration—must be represented in that experience. 
There is, I think, something to all this.  Strategy 4c is indeed more 
plausible than strategy 4b.  Or, at least, it is once tweaked in response to the 
following two worries. The first worry is that 4c is unattractively 
additionalist given it says that your unpleasant pain involves your 
wanting the non-occurrence of some damage that you experience as 
occurring and that this is bad for you only when, additionally, you 
experience the desire-frustrating-ness of that damage. But FOD theorists 
might address this by tweaking clause (i) of the strategy—that is, the FOD 
account itself—so that what the strategy explains in terms of wide-scope 
experienced desire-frustration is not just the badness of pain’s 
unpleasantness, but the unpleasantness itself.  Hence: 
 
Better FOD.  Your having an unpleasant pain consists in 
your having an experience representing an instance of 
damage as frustrating-a-desire-of-yours. 
 
As desired, Better FOD makes strategy 4c non-additionalist.  And it has 
another advantage.  For notice that original FOD doesn’t seem to 
generalise beyond the pain case to other instances of unpleasantness.  
After all, Linda’s situation meets the requirements of a generalised version 
of FOD—she has an anti-x desire while visually experiencing x—yet her 
situation not only need not be bad for her, it need not be unpleasant either.30  
Better FOD, by contrast, fairs better.  For the idea that her case must be 
unpleasant seems a good deal more plausible if we stipulate that it 
involves wide- rather than narrow-scope experienced desire-frustration. 
 The second worry about 4c is that wide-scope experienced desire-
frustration is too high-level a state—in particular, too demanding a state—
to be what your pain’s unpleasantness consists in, involving as it does 
your experiencing a bodily condition as standing in the frustrating relation 
to a desire of yours.  But FOD theorists can address this worry too with a 
tweak: 
 
																																								 																				
30 See note 23Error! Bookmark not defined. 
31 I have formulated Best FOD in terms of wide- rather than narrow-scope Humeanism.  But  
Best FOD.  Your having an unpleasant pain consists in  
your having an experience representing an instance of 
damage as bad for you, where something’s instantiating 
the relevant sort of badness-for-you is a matter of its 
frustrating an intrinsic desire of yours. 
 
To elaborate:  substituting “bad for you” for Better FOD’s “frustrating-a-
desire-of-yours”, Best FOD says that your pain’s unpleasantness does 
indeed consist in your interoceptively representing the desire-frustrating-
ness of some bodily damage, but adds that this property, desire-frustrating-
ness, is represented by your pain under the mode of presentation, being bad 
for you.  FOD theorists who have come this far and have Humean 
sympathies have—it seems to me—no reason to resist this tweak.  On the 
contrary, Best FOD looks like an attractive way to make unpleasant pain 
less demanding than Better FOD makes it.31  
In short, Best FOD is an improvement on FOD.  And, with Best 
FOD inserted, I concede that the wide-scope version of the experienced 
desire frustration strategy offers a considerably more promising way—less 
vulnerable to the Linda and Ed cases—of invoking anti-damage desires to 
explain unpleasant pain and its badness.  But, for FOD theorists, there is 
nonetheless one more problem.  Best FOD is actually a version of 
evaluativism!  It’s a version of the very view that FOD theorists are 
opposing.  After all, Best FOD says that your pain’s unpleasantness 
consists in its representing some bodily damage as bad for you.  All it adds 
to that account is an answer to a question that evaluativists are often 
asked:  “What is the nature of the disvalue that unpleasant pains 
putatively represent?”.  Best FOD’s answer is that the badness-for-you of 
your damaged states, represented in your unpleasant pains, is (or is 
grounded in) the property, being intrinsically unwanted by you.  In short, 
Best FOD is evaluativism plus a desire-theoretic account of the pain-
represented badness of the relevant bodily conditions.  Some evaluativists, 
interestingly, have endorsed just such a view.32  But of course FOD 
theorists, who oppose evaluativism, cannot.  
																																								 																				
31 I have formulated Best FOD in terms of wide- rather than narrow-scope Humeanism.  But  
there is room for a narrow-scope version too. 
32 Tim Schroeder claims that “displeasure is a perceptual representation of one’s desires being 
on balance less well satisfied … than expected” (2004: 97) and in correspondence says that this 
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In sum, no construal of subjective desire-frustration allows my 
FOD-theorist critics to accommodate the non-instrumental badness of 
unpleasant pain.  For the badness of your pain depends neither on your 
believing your anti-damage desire to be frustrated, nor on your merely 
wanting the non-occurrence of damage while experiencing damage as 
occurring.  And while it may depend on your experiencing the desire-
frustrating-ness of that damage, FOD can make best use of that idea only 
when tweaked in such a way that it becomes a desire-theoretic version of 
evaluativism. 
 
7.  Strategy 5: the Additionalist Second-Order Desire Strategy 
 
To this point, my efforts on behalf of evaluativism have been entirely 
negative, directed at undermining my critics’ normative strategies.  Let’s 
now turn to what positive strategies I and other evaluativists might 
pursue instead.  To meet the normative condition, recall, evaluativism 
requires that your interoceptively experiencing a given state of damage as 
bad for you itself be non-instrumentally bad for you.  But how might this 
be defended against the objections posed in §2?  Here, I consider one way; 
in the final section, I turn to another. 
 A frequently neglected approach evaluativists might take is the 
following: 
 
 Strategy 5.  Additionalist second-order desire strategy 
(i) Explain pain’s unpleasantness in terms of a pain 
experience’s evaluative content. 
(ii) Hold that, given narrow-scope Humeanism, your 
unpleasant pain is bad for you when and because you 
intrinsically desire not to be undergoing unpleasant 
pain. 
 
Why is this so often neglected?  Because, I suspect, it is apt to strike people 
as either a version of instrumentalism or a SOD strategy.  But in fact it’s 
neither.  It is not a version of instrumentalism because it doesn’t explain 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
complex desiderative property is thus represented under such a mode of presentation as bad-
for-me or worse-for-me.  
the badness of pain’s unpleasantness in terms of its bad consequences.  
Rather, it invokes the same Humean idea that SOD and FOD invoked:  
that intrinsically wanting the non-obtaining of x renders x non-
instrumentally bad for you.  Nor is it a SOD strategy.  For it does not 
explain pain’s unpleasantness in terms of anti-pain desires.  The desires it 
invokes are not anti-pain desires, but anti-unpleasantness desires; and 
they are invoked to explain not pain’s unpleasantness—which is explained 
in terms of pain’s evaluative content—but the badness of that 
unpleasantness. 
The strategy’s appeal to anti-unpleasantness rather than anti-pain 
desires has two advantages.  First, what the strategy claims is made bad 
by anti-unpleasantness desires is unpleasant pain, not pain per se.  Second, 
unlike anti-pain desires, anti-unpleasantness desires are desires we very 
obviously have.  The strategy also has significant advantages over the 
FOD strategies.  For it is not an approach on which the non-instrumental 
badness of pain’s unpleasantness depends on your body’s actually being 
damaged, or your believing it to be damaged, or your merely wanting it 
not to be damaged while experiencing that it is.  Moreover, it captures the 
experientiality of the badness of pain’s unpleasantness, at least to the 
following extent:  what your  anti-unpleasantness desire is directed at is 
the feeling of your pain’s unpleasantness, hence on this strategy that 
feeling is what is non-instrumentally bad for you. 
Notice, however, that while not instrumentalist, strategy 5 is 
additionalist.  To  explain pain’s unpleasantness and its badness, it 
invokes distinct explanans:  evaluative content, on the one hand, and anti-
unpleasantness desires, on the other.  To put it another way, while the 
disvalue it explains is non-instrumental, it is not intrinsic.  Rather, 
depending on a desire additional to the unpleasant pain, the badness is 
extrinsic.  Still, this version of additionalism is at least not as implausible as 
other versions.  Recall, for example, FOD’s desire-frustration strategy, 
which made your unpleasant pain non-instrumentally bad for you only 
when the relevant body part was actually damaged.  We objected that 
God’s leaving your unpleasant pain in place while eliminating the damage 
would not make your pain any less bad for you.  But the parallel objection 
against strategy 5 is less powerful.  For it is considerably less obvious that 
God’s leaving your unpleasant pain in place while eliminating your 
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intrinsic desire for it not to be occurring would leave your pain’s normative 
status unchanged.  
 That said, I fear strategy 5’s additionalism is ultimately 
unappealing.  Consider: 
 
Coolman has an intensely unpleasant pain, but is 
indifferent to its unpleasantness in the following sense:  
he lacks an intrinsic desire for the unpleasantness not to 
occur, despite being capable of such a desire and 
reflecting on the matter. 
 
Strangelove has an intensely unpleasant pain, but lacks 
an intrinsic desire for the unpleasantness not to occur 
and instead has a strong positive intrinsic desire for its 
unpleasantness to occur. 
 
What is unappealing is strategy 5’s commitments in these two cases.  It 
must say that, given Coolman and Strangelove’s desires, the intense 
unpleasantness of their pain is actually not non-instrumentally bad for 
them, not even slightly, not even pro tanto.  Indeed, the intense 
unpleasantness of Strangelove’s pain is—the strategy must say—non-
instrumentally good for her.  We might well balk at this.  There is a strong 
inclination to say that, on the contrary, the unpleasantness even of 
Coolman and Strangelove’s pain is indeed non-instrumentally bad for 
them.  Relatedly, there is a strong inclination to say that their lack of anti-
unpleasantness desires, and Strangelove’s possession of a pro-
unpleasantness desire, reflect failures of rationality on their part.33 
Focusing on this last point, friends of strategy 5 might reply that 
there are real cases of Coolman and Strangelove in which we don’t impute 
irrationality.34  Consider asymbolics, the lobotomised, and masochists:  
asymbolics and the lobotomised say they don’t mind their pains, while 
masochists appear to want theirs, yet arguably we do not say any of them 
																																								 																				
33 Those sharing this inclination include Bramble 2013 (213), Goldstein 1980 (354), and Rachels 
2000 (201).  Even Humeans (in my sense) can allow that intrinsic desires can be irrational or 
inaccurate in this sense, notice, provided they don’t think all disvalue is a matter of negative 
desire.   
34 There are elements of this reply in Cutter and Tye 2014. 
thereby manifest irrationality.  In reply, however, these cases are quite 
different from Coolman and Strangelove’s.  Asymbolics do indeed say 
they don’t mind their pains, but this is because their pains are not 
unpleasant, not because they lack anti-unpleasantness desires.  And what 
the lobotomised don’t mind is arguably not pain’s unpleasantness, but its 
downstream emotional impact—anxiety and the rest—which their 
lobotomies seem to eliminate.35  As for masochists, what they positively 
want is not unpleasantness per se, but the pleasure that their pain—or 
perhaps its unpleasantness—somehow generates.  So, in the end, none of 
these cases helps friends of strategy 5. 
Babies might seem a clearer case of humans who lack anti-
unpleasantness desires, since they seem to lack the introspective 
sophistication that such desires arguably require.36  And arguably we 
would not say that babies thereby manifest irrationality.  But if babies do 
lack anti-unpleasantness desires, this surely counts against strategy 5, not 
for it.  For it commits the strategy to denying, implausibly, that babies’ 
unpleasant pains are non-instrumentally bad for them. 
Fellow evaluativists Brian Cutter and Michael Tye offer a 
different defence of strategy 5 (2014).  They claim that anti-unpleasantness 
desires form “naturally and spontaneously” in properly functioning 
minds, thanks to such desires being adaptive, motivating subjects as they 
do to minimise the harmful conditions that tend to cause the unpleasant 
pains they’re directed at (2014: 427, 429).  Hence, while they concede the 
intuition that subjects who lack anti-unpleasantness desires are suffering a 
defect, it is (they argue) a defect not of rationality, but of proper functioning 
(2014: 428-431).37  However, this reply is less compelling that it might 
seem.  For notice that Cutter and Tye appear to think of the 
advantageousness of unpleasant pain as resting on the motivationality of 
the anti-unpleasantness desires they think unpleasant pain naturally 
triggers.  But this might be questioned, especially by evaluativists.  For one 
of the reasons to be an evaluativist is precisely the attractiveness of the 
																																								 																				
35 Melzack and Wall report that those lobotomised for chronic pain continue to “complain 
vociferously about pinprick and mild burn” and say “they still have the ‘little’ pain, but [that] 
the ‘big’ pain, the suffering, the anguish are gone” (2008: 137). 
36 The  motivationality of babies’ pains is no reason to doubt this; see below. 
37 I’ve re-cast in terms of “unpleasantness” what Cutter and Tye frame in terms of 
“painfulness”.  
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idea that unpleasant pains, conceived as experiences in which damage is 
represented as bad for oneself, themselves motivate anti-damage actions 
quite independently of any desires.38 Hence Cutter and Tye risk over-
estimating the survival advantage conferred by anti-unpleasantness 
desires, hence the degree to which Coolman and Strangelove’s 
defectiveness can be captured in terms of improper functioning.  
I do not pretend that any of this amounts to a refutation of 
strategy 5.  But I do think the worry Coolman and Strangelove pose is 
serious.  Suppose, to put it another way, you find yourself intrinsically 
wanting the non-occurrence in you of beliefs representing given states of 
bodily damage as bad for you.  Intuitively, this differs fundamentally from 
the case of intrinsically wanting not to be in unpleasant pain.  And the 
difference, surely, is the following.  A desire to not believe that a given 
bodily state is bad for you is not justified by the non-instrumental badness-
for-you of the belief that is its target.  For that belief is not non-
instrumentally bad for you.  By contrast, a desire not to be in unpleasant 
pain is justified by the non-instrumental badness of its target.  Or at least:  
if any intrinsic desires are thus justified—as Cutter and Tye agree some 
are—then anti-unpleasantness desires are surely a paradigm case.39 
To put the point a final way, Strategy 5 implausibly makes the 
phenomenal character of pain’s unpleasantness comparable to the colour-
related character of visual experiences.  By this strategy’s lights, the only 
normative difference between pain’s unpleasantness and what we might 
call the “reddish” character of a visual experience of a red tomato is that 
humans and other animals have evolved typically to want the non-
occurrence of the former but not to want the non-occurrence of the latter.  
Again, in themselves, unpleasantness and reddishness are both 
normatively neutral.  This can seem implausible.  While we should 
certainly accept that a pain might be normatively neutral, as in cases of 
pain asymbolia, the idea that a pain’s unpleasantness might be neutral 
																																								 																				
38  See Bain 2013, 2014, 2017, and especially in review. 
39 On justified, intrinsic desires, see Cutter and Tye 429.  It is tempting to add that the anti-belief 
desire (as we might call it) and the anti-unpleasantness desire are alike in respect of the survival 
advantage they confer. But, in correspondence, Cutter points out that this isn't obvious since the 
desire not to believe that a given damaged state is bad for oneself might prompt one to engage 
in maladaptive, motivated reasoning so as to believe, even when false, that the damaged state is 
not bad for oneself. 
stretches credulity much further.  There is a strong inclination to say that, 
on the contrary, what is distinctive about unpleasantness vis-à-vis 
reddishness is precisely the former’s inherent disvalue. 
In sum, while strategy 5’s commitments regarding Coolman and 
Strangelove might be bullets that evaluativists should bite if there were no 
other strategy, it behoves us at least to look for an alternative.  In the next 
section, I suggest there is one.40 
 
8.  Strategy 6:  The Perceptual Strategy 
 
The normative objection, recall, says that evaluativism explains your 
pain’s unpleasantness in terms of something that is not non-
instrumentally bad for you.  Evaluativists deny this.  We insist that, on the 
contrary, the experience our explanation invokes—the putative perception 
of the badness-for-yourself of a given instance of bodily damage—is non-
instrumentally bad for you.  According to strategy 5, recall, this is so when 
and because you intrinsically want that experience’s non-occurrence.  In 
this section, I sketch an alternative:  that such experiences are intrinsically 
bad for you.  Call this the perceptual strategy. 
 The central idea is that the feeling of pain’s unpleasantness, which 
consists in your seeming to perceive the badness-for-you of a given instance 
of bodily damage, is bad for you not just non-instrumentally, but 
intrinsically.  This point, happily, is not hostage to the fortunes of 
Humeanism.  And it captures better than its competitors the idea that 
what is bad about pain’s unpleasantness is how it feels.  True, strategy 5 can 
endorse that idea too, but strategy 5 says the feeling is bad for you by dint 
of your directing at it an additional anti-unpleasantness desire, whereas the 
perceptual strategy says it is bad for you per se.  Hence, crucially, the 
perceptual strategy allows us to say that the unpleasantness even of 
Coolman’s pain is non-instrumentally bad for him, and that Strangelove’s 
pro-unpleasantness desires are not merely unusual, nor merely 
maladaptive, but irrational or inaccurate, directed as they are at a feeling 
																																								 																				
40  My critics too might avail themselves of additional anti-unpleasantness desires to meet the 
normative condition.  For instance, SOD theorists might say that what makes your pain’s 
unpleasantness bad for you is an anti-unpleasantness desire, where that unpleasantness in turn 
consists in your pain being the object of an anti-pain desire.  But they actually don’t say this and 
would face the difficulties above if they did. 
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that is antecedently bad for her.41  In sum, the perceptual strategy has a 
great deal to recommend it, provided the critics’ doubts can be addressed.  
But can they? 
 We might, I suggest, distinguish as many as five doubts.  The 
first centres on the following: 
 
Why-think question 
Why think that your having a perceptual experience 
representing that your body is in a bad condition is itself 
bad for you, intrinsically? 
 
This question seems more threatening than it is.  For we might simply 
reply as follows: 
 
The Leibniz’s Law argument 
1.  Your pain’s unpleasantness is bad for you 
intrinsically. 
2.  Your pain’s unpleasantness is a matter of your 
undergoing a perceptual experience representing a 
damaged state of your body as bad for you. 
3.  Therefore, your undergoing a perceptual experience 
representing a damaged state of your body as bad for 
you is bad for you intrinsically. 
 
That is, evaluativists might appeal to the idea that pain’s unpleasantness is 
intrinsically bad—which is intuitive and which underpinned our 
complaints both about instrumentalism and about strategy 5—and then 
exploit evaluativism itself (premise 2 above) and Leibniz’s Law to argue 
from that idea to the intrinsic badness of perceiving bodily conditions as 
being bad for oneself.  Of course, circularity would loom if the case for 
evaluativism exploited this argument’s conclusion.  But it doesn’t.  
Evaluativists are evaluativists for various reasons—in my case centring on 
																																								 																				
41 An unrestricted form of narrow-scope Humeanism would commit us to saying that, if 
Strangelove intrinsically wants it, the unpleasantness of her pain is to that extent also good for 
her (pro tanto and non-instrumentally).  But that doesn’t rule out that Strangelove’s pro-
unpleasantness desire is rationally criticisable as an intrinsic desire for something that is 
antecedently bad for her.  	
the role of unpleasant pain in motivating and rationalising behaviour—
but none has argued for the view on the basis of the antecedent 
obviousness of the badness for a subject of perceiving the badness for 
himself of his body’s damaged states (Bain 2017).  Critics are free of course 
to reject the case for evaluativism, but that is beside the point at this 
juncture.  For the charge being addressed is that evaluativism violates the 
normative condition, not that evaluativism is unmotivated.  
A second worry might be that the Leibniz’s Law argument is 
better taken as a reductio of evaluativism, as an argument to the effect that 
(2) should be rejected given (1) and the deep implausibility of (3).  But in 
fact not even my critics think that (3) is on its face deeply implausible.  
Brady, on the contrary, calls it “natural and intuitive” (2015: 406).  The 
normative objection is supposed to be an attempt to show it to be 
implausible, not a point that presupposes its implausibility. 
A third worry is that, even if not clearly false, (3) lacks (1)’s 
obviousness.  Evaluativism cannot be true, the worry goes, if the badness 
for you of your experiencing the badness of your damaged states is less obvious 
than the badness for you of your pain’s unpleasantness.42  But why?  After 
all, the context “… is obviously bad for one” is intensional.  Even if it is the 
case that inserting “your undergoing unpleasant pain” produces a truth 
whereas inserting “your experiencing a damaged state of your own body 
as bad for you” produces a falsehood, this doesn’t refute evaluativism.  
Were it a condition on the success of  reductions that their explanans be 
substitutable for their explananda while leaving all platitudes 
platitudinous, no informative reduction would ever succeed.  Consider for 
comparison an account of redness according to which redness is the 
disposition of objects to produce “reddish” experiences in normal 
observers in normal conditions.  That account might well be false, but it is 
not refuted by pointing out that a competent user of “red” might find it 
unobvious.43     
																																								 																				
42 This argument is akin to—and as unpromising as—G. E. Moore’s notorious open question 
argument (Moore 1903). 
43 My reply here doesn’t jeopardise my objection to the FOD theorist’s narrow-scope 
experienced desire-frustration strategy.  For my argument was not that a platitude is eliminated 
by substituting FOD’s account of unpleasant pain for “unpleasant pain” in “unpleasant pain is 
non-instrumentally bad for its subject”, but rather that Linda and Ed’s cases are 
counterexamples to the general idea that narrow-scope experienced desire frustration is bad for 
its subject.  Hence, as noted above, my argument closely parallels my opponents’ anti-
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Turning to a fourth point, the critic might protest that, for all this, 
evaluativists have not yet explained what it is that is bad for you about 
perceptually experiencing a bodily state of yours as being bad for you.  
That, I concede, is true.  But it is far from obvious that, in this respect, 
evaluativists are in a worse position than our opponents.  For our 
opponents’ too have not explained the putative normative truths to which 
they appeal.  They have not, for instance, explained what is non-
instrumentally bad for you about the occurrence of situations whose non-
occurrence you intrinsically want, or about the frustration of your intrinsic 
desires, or about the subjective frustration of those desires, or about pain’s 
intrusiveness.  Now, there may be little to say on these scores, since  
normative explanation presumably comes to an end somewhere.  But if 
that point is available to my critics, it is available to me too. 
 Finally, my critics might at this point (as anticipated in §2) turn to 
the case of normative belief—or, better, normative judgement—and ask the 
following:  
 
Normative contrast question  
Consider an unpleasant pain experience of yours.  If its 
intrinsic badness for you consists in its representing a 
bodily state as bad for you, why isn’t your making a 
judgement with the same content also intrinsically bad 
for you? 
 
But I think this challenge too can be met. To see this, begin by considering 
a parallel question: 
 
Phenomenal contrast question  
Consider a visual experience in which a cube looks red 
to you.  If its phenomenal character consists in its 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
evaluativist point that certain beliefs are counterexamples to the idea that representing bodily 
damage as bad for you is itself non-instrumentally bad for you.  The parallel suggests that 
evaluativism’s normative strategy is at the very least in no worse shape than FOD’s.  Below, I 
argue in effect that it is in better shape, since (as remarked in §6 above; see for instance note 27) 
my opponents motivate the badness of narrow-scope experienced desire-frustration by 
appealing to desire per se, making Linda and Ed’s cases legitimate counterexamples, whereas 
the strategy I develop below appeals not to the relevant disvalue’s representation per se, but to 
its perceptual representation. 
representing a cube as red, why doesn’t a judgement 
with the same content have the same character? 
 
Registering the parallel between these questions helps, I suggest, because 
there is arguably more than a parallel here.  For, faced with the normative 
contrast question, adherents of the perceptual strategy ought to say the 
following.  What is intrinsically bad for you about your unpleasant pain is 
its unpleasantness construed as a certain phenomenal feel.  And, while 
evaluativists do indeed explain that feel in terms of the representation of  a 
given bodily state’s badness for you, we invoke not just any 
representations, but perceptual representations.  Again, we say that the 
unpleasant feel consists in the perceptual representation of a state as bad 
for you.   And if at this point the critics ask (à la Brady 2015) how that 
could make a normative difference—again, how a representation’s being 
perceptual could explain the normative contrast between pains and the 
corresponding judgements—the reply should be that, if this question does 
not collapse into an objection already addressed (for instance the worry 
that we have not explained what is bad for you about the feeling of 
unpleasantness) then it can only amount to the question how a 
representation’s perceptuality could explain the phenomenal contrast 
between it and a corresponding judgement.  Specifically, it must amount 
to the question:  how could there be a phenomenal difference between an 
interoceptive experience that a given state of damage is bad for you and a 
judgement that a given state of damage is bad for you—if the phenomenal 
character of an experience consists in its possessing the content it 
possesses?  The residual worry behind the normative contrast question, in 
other words, is simply an interoceptive version of the phenomenal contrast 
question.  Again, the worry about a normative contrast has become a worry 
about a phenomenal contrast.  Hence the worry is neither specifically 
normative nor specifically about evaluativism.  Instead, it is a quite 
general worry in the philosophy of consciousness—the challenge of finding 
the feel, as it’s sometimes called—which is faced by any view on which an 
experience’s feel consists in its possessing the content it possesses.  It is 
not, then, a worry that evaluativists specifically must address.44	 
																																								 																				
44 Representationalists, who explain experiences’ phenomenal character in terms of their 
possession of content, have tried to “find the feel” in various ways.  Some (below) appeal to 
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Although the matter could be left here, it might be helpful in 
closing to register that two of the ways in which the phenomenal contrast 
between perceptual experience and judgement is sometimes elaborated sit 
rather well with the idea that a crucial ingredient in the badness of pain’s 
unpleasantness is its perceptuality.  Start with the contrast between seeing 
that there is a red cube before you and judging that there is.  On the first 
elaboration, the visual episode unlike the judgement is an episode in 
which a red cube’s being before you is impressed on your senses.  Again, 
unlike the judgement, the perceptual experience has the role and 
phenomenology of an episode in which (having opened your eyes and 
looked in the right direction) an extramental circumstance is foist on your 
awareness, at least putatively (Evans 1982, McDowell 1994).  The second 
elaboration instead invokes the notions of encounter or contact.  By contrast 
with the judgement, the idea goes, the episode in which it looks to you as 
though there is a red cube before you involves your encountering the cube 
and its redness, at least putatively.45  Now, these metaphors of impressing 
and encountering need cashing, of course, but even as they stand they 
arguably sit nicely with the idea that what underlies the intrinsic badness 
of pain’s unpleasantness is the perceptuality of the representations 
involved, for the following reasons. 
First, I noted above that some of my opponents concede the 
intuitiveness of the idea that it is intrinsically bad for you to perceptually 
represent your body’s damaged states as bad for you.  But notice that the 
idea becomes more plausible still when expressed in the terms just 
mooted.  For we might now say that what is bad for you about your 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
experience’s distinctive involvement of circumstances being putatively impressed on subjects or 
subjects putatively encountering things in the world (Evans 1982, McDowell 1994).  Others—as 
alternative to these metaphors or as a way of unpacking them—invoke the idea that perceptual 
contents involve distinctive modes of presentation or are distinctively fine-grained or “poised” 
or non-conceptual (Peacocke 1992, Tye 1995).  I shall not explore which approach is best, nor 
which is compatible with which versions of representationalism, nor which version of 
representationalism evaluativists should prefer.  I shall, however, underscore the generality of 
the basic idea:  that what makes for the phenomenal difference between an unpleasant pain and 
the corresponding evaluative judgement is whatever makes for the phenomenal difference 
between experience and judgement in general.  It is not something specific to pain, 
unpleasantness, or affect. 
45 Evaluativists who use these terms must disagree with those (e.g. Travis 2004 and Brewer 
2006) who think that capturing the relevant idea of encounter requires denying perceptual 
experiences content. 
unpleasant pain is not your merely representing damaged states of your 
body as bad for you, but rather your putatively encountering those states’ 
badness-for-you, or your having their badness-for-you putatively 
impressed on you.  The idea that episodes of this sort should themselves be 
bad for you is, I suggest, pre-theoretically even more compelling.46 
 Second, when articulated in these terms, the perceptual strategy 
allows us to capture what might be found attractive in Martínez and 
Klein’s intrusiveness idea, discussed in §3.  For, even while rejecting 
instrumentalism, it is easy to feel that there was something right about the 
thought that the badness of unpleasant pain consists in the way pain is, as 
Klein puts it, an “outside imposition”, “impinging” on us (2015b: 182-3, 
193).    And the perceptual strategy seems to me a good way of capturing 
just what is right about that idea.  For the strategy says that what is bad 
for us is something’s impinging not on our agency, as Klein claims, but on 
our awareness.  In short, the perceptual strategy echoes Klein’s talk of 
imposition and impingement, but in an attractively non-instrumentalist 
key.47 
Third, notice that merely imagining yourself “from the inside” 
undergoing an unpleasant pain need not itself be unpleasant or non-
instrumentally bad for you.  Notice too that there are indications that the 
pain experiences of subjects with depersonalisation syndrome, who feel 
“detached” from their bodies “as if … living in a dream or movie”, are—
like the pain experiences of asymbolics—not unpleasant or non-
instrumentally bad for them.48  The perceptual strategy arguably casts 
light on both these cases.  For even if imagining pain and undergoing 
depersonalised pain are in some sense sensory experiences, neither 
involves a putative encounter with reality.  Neither, in other words, has the 
																																								 																				
46 Korsgaard sometimes appears to agree.  She says that pain is a “perception that you have a 
reason to change your [bodily] condition” (1996: 148).  And, denying that “value applies 
directly only to conscious states themselves” and that “pleasure and pain merely bring us 
information about values which are out there in the world”, she adds, congenially, that it is bad 
to perceive something bad partly because of the badness of what one perceives even if that 
badness isn’t real (1996: 155).  Curiously, however, other things Korsgaard says sit more 
comfortably with the SOD strategies or even the intrusiveness account (e.g. 1996: 148, 153-4). 
47  Bennett Helm talks about pain involving “one’s body impressing itself on one” (2002: 20, 27). 
48 For the quoted definition, see APA 2000.  On depersonalisation and unpleasantness, see Sierra 
2009, Klein 2015a, and Dokic in review. 
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key feature that—on one of our elaborations—the perceptual strategy 
invokes. 
 Finally, recall the messenger-shooting version of the normative 
objection.  If experiencing that a given bodily condition is bad for you is 
bad for you, the worry went, why isn’t being told that a given bodily 
condition is bad for you bad for you?  The perceptual strategy provides an 
answer.  Experiencing your body as you do when in pain is a matter of 
putatively encountering your body and its states; it is not like merely being 
told about it.49   
But what about the self-elimination problem, set aside in §2?  
Construing unpleasant pains as perceptual representations of the badness 
of certain bodily states, the worry went, evaluativism is incapable of 
capturing the idea that pain’s unpleasantness itself motivates actions 
directed at its own elimination—actions, that is, directed at eliminating 
unpleasant pain.  So far, nothing has been said to address this.  Happily, 
however, little needs to be.  For evaluativists should simply deny that 
pain’s unpleasantness is self-eliminating.  It is true of course that, in pain, 
we perform unpleasantness-directed actions, such as taking painkillers.  
But, unlike other actions performed when in pain, unpleasantness-directed 
actions are motivated not by your pain’s unpleasantness per se, but only 
by desires (intrinsic and extrinsic) for that unpleasantness not to be 
occurring (Bain in review).  In short, even if evaluativists cannot meet the 
self-elimination condition, they can plausibly deny it.50 
   
		
 
In conclusion, I have made three key claims.  First, accounts of pain’s 
unpleasantness must meet the normative condition; instrumentalism will 
not do.  Second, those who argue that evaluativism cannot meet the 
normative condition advance desire-theoretic accounts of pain’s 
unpleasantness that themselves fail to meet it.  Finally, evaluativism 
actually can meet the condition, in either of two ways.  Evaluativists can 
																																								 																				
49 This may suggest it is better for the perceptual strategy to construe perceptions as encounters 
than impressings—though even the impressings model can be elaborated such that acts of 
testimony don’t fit it (McDowell 1994).  
50  Arguably, notice, even SOD fails to meet the self-elimination condition, invoking as it does 
anti-pain rather than anti-unpleasantness desires. 
appeal to anti-unpleasantness desires, as per strategy 5.  Or, to better 
accommodate our intuitions about Coolman and Strangelove, and to 
capture more fully the experientiality—indeed, the perceptuality—of the 
badness of pain’s unpleasantness, evaluativists can deploy the perceptual 
strategy.51 
David Bain, University of Glasgow 
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